Formation of the Ethiopian Empire (Ethiopia and Eritrea)
The Aksumite Kingdom was a predominantly Christian state that at the height of its power controlled what is now the Ethiopian Highlands, Eritrea, and the coastal regions of Southern Arabia.[24] The Aksumite Kingdom was responsible for the development of the religious movement that became the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church.[24] However, the expansion of Islam in the 7th century caused the decline of the Aksumite Kingdom, and most of the lowland populations converted to Islam, while the highland people remained Christian.[24] Since the Aksumite people became divided between Christian highlands and Islamic lowlands, religious and tribal tensions and rivalries between the people intensified.[24] The Aksumite society changed into a loose confederation of city-states that maintained the language of Aksum.[24]
Additionally, expeditions by Ezana into the Kingdom of Kush at Meroe in Sudan may have brought about the latter polity’s demise, though there is evidence that the kingdom was experiencing a period of decline beforehand. As a result of Ezana’s expansions, Aksum bordered the Roman province of Egypt. The degree of Aksum’s control over Yemen is uncertain. Though there is little evidence supporting Aksumite control of the region at that time, his title, which includes king of Saba and Salhen, Himyar and Dhu-Raydan (all in modern-day Yemen), along with gold Aksumite coins with the inscriptions, “king of the Habshat” or “Habashite,” indicate that Aksum might have retained some legal or actual footing in the area.[25]
After the fall of Aksum due to declining sea trade from fierce competition by Muslims and changing climate, the power base of the kingdom migrated south and shifted its capital to Kubar (near Agew). They moved southwards because, even though the Axumite Kingdom welcomed and protected the companions of Prophet Muhammad to Ethiopia, who came as refugees to escape the persecution of the ruling families of Mecca and earned the friendship and respect of the Prophet. Their friendship deteriorated when South-Arabians invaded the Dahlak islands through the port of Adulis and destroyed it, which was the economic backbone for the prosperous Aksumite Kingdom. After a second golden age in the early 6th century[26] the Aksumite empire began to decline in the mid 6th century,[27] eventually ceasing its production of coins in the early 7th century. Around this same time, the Aksumite population was forced to go farther inland to the highlands for protection, abandoning Aksum as the capital. Arab writers of the time continued to describe Ethiopia (no longer referred to as Aksum) as an extensive and powerful state, though they had lost control of most of the coast and their tributaries. While land was lost in the north, it was gained in the south; and, though Ethiopia was no longer an economic power, it still attracted Arab merchants. The capital was moved to a new location, currently unknown, though it may have been called Ku’bar or Jarmi.[26]
Afthe decline of Aksum, the Eritrean highlands were under the domain of Christian Kingdom of Medri Bahri, ruled by Bahri Negus. The area was then known as Ma’ikele Bahri (“between the seas/rivers”, i.e. the land between the Red Sea and the Mereb river).[28] The entire coastal domain of Ma’ikele Bahri was under the Adal Sultanate during the reign of Sultan Badlay.[29][30] The state was later reconquered by Ethiopian Emperors namely Zara Yaqob, and renamed the Medri Bahr[31]i (“Sea land” in Tigrinya, although it included some areas like Shire in Ethiopia on the other side of the Mereb, today in Ethiopia).[32] With its capital at Debarwa,[33] the state’s main provinces were Hamasien, Serae and Akele Guzai.
Under the reign of Degna Djan, during the 10th century, the empire kept expanding south, and sent troops into the modern-day region of Kaffa,[34] while at the same time undertaking missionary activity into Angot and Amhara.
Local history holds that, around 960, a Jewish Queen named Yodit (Judith) or “Gudit” defeated the empire and burned its churches and literature. While there is evidence of churches being burned and an invasion around this time, her existence has been questioned by some western authors. Another possibility is that the Aksumite power was ended by a southern pagan queen named Bani al-Hamwiyah, possibly of the tribe al-Damutah or Damoti of the Sidama people. It is clear from contemporary sources that a female usurper did indeed rule the country at this time, and that her reign ended some time before 1003. After a short Dark Age, the Aksumite Empire was succeeded by the Agaw Zagwe dynasty in the 11th or 12th century (most likely around 1137), although limited in size and scope. However, Yekuno Amlak, who killed the last Zagwe king and founded the modern Solomonic dynasty around 1270 traced his ancestry and his right to rule from the last emperor of Aksum, Dil Na’od. It should be mentioned that the end of the Aksumite Empire didn’t mean the end of Aksumite culture and traditions; for example, the architecture of the Zagwe dynasty at Lalibela and Yemrehana Krestos Church shows heavy Aksumite influence.[35]
From the late first to early second millennium Eritrea witnessed a period of migrations: Since the late 7th century, so with the decline of Aksum, large parts of Eritrea, including the highlands, were overrun by pagan Beja, who supposedly founded several kingdoms on its soil, like Baqlin, Jarin and Qata.[36] The Beja rule declined in the 13th century. Subsequently, the Beja were expelled from the highlands by Abyssinian settlers from the south.[37] Another people, the Bellou, originated from a smiliar millieu as the Beja. They appeared first in the 12th century, from then on they dominated parts of northwestern Eritrea until the 16th century.[38] After 1270, with the destruction of the Zagwe Kingdom, many Agaw fled to what is now Eritrea. Most were culturally and linguistically assimilated into the local Tigrinya culture, with the notable exception of the Bilen.[39] Yet another people that arrived after the fall of Aksum were the Cushitic-speaking Saho, who had established themselves in the highlands until the 14th century.[40]
Previously, this area has been known as Ma’ikele Bahr (“between the seas/rivers,” i.e. the land between the Red Sea and the Mereb river), but during the reign of emperor Zara Yaqob it was rebranded as the domain of the Bahr Negash, the Medri Bahri (“Sea land” in Tigrinya, although it included some areas like Shire on the other side of the Mereb, today in Ethiopia).[41][42] With its capital at Debarwa,[43] the state’s main provinces were Hamasien, Serae and Akele Guzai. In 1879, Medri Bahri was annexed by Ras Alula, who defended the area against the Italians until they finally occupied it in 1889.[44]
Fearing of what recently occurred, Axum shifted its capital near Agew In the middle of the sixteenth century Adal Sultanate armies led by Harar leader Ahmed Gragn invaded the Ethiopian Highlands in what is known as the “Conquest of Habasha”.[45] Following Gragn invasions the southern part of the Empire was lost to Ethiopia and scattered several groups like the Gurage people were cut off from the rest of Abyssinia. In the late sixteenth century the nomadic Oromo people penetrated the Abyssinian plains occupying large territories during the Oromo migrations.[46][47] Abyssinian warlords often competed with each other for dominance of the realm. The Amharas seemed to gain the upper hand with the accession of Yekuno Amlak of Ancient Bete Amhara in 1270, after defeating the Agaw lords of Lasta.
The Gondarian dynasty, which since the 16th century had become the centre of Royal pomp and ceremony of Abyssinia, finally lost its influence as a result of the emergence of powerful regional lords, following the murder of Iyasu I, also known as Iyasu the Great. The decline in the prestige of the dynasty led to the semi-anarchic era of Zemene Mesafint (“Era of the Princes”), in which rival warlords fought for power and the Yejju Oromo እንደራሴ enderases (“regents”) had effective control. The emperors were considered to be figureheads. Until a young man named Kassa Haile Giorgis also known as Emperor Tewodros brought end to Zemene Mesafint by defeating all his rivals and took the throne in 1855. The Tigrayans made only a brief return to the throne in the person of Yohannes IV in 1872, whose death in 1889 resulted in the power base shifting back to the dominant Amharic-speaking elite prior to Yejju Oromo and Tigrayan rule. His successor Menelik II an Emperor of Amhara origin seized power. League of Nations in 1935 reported that after the invasion of Menelik’s forces into non Abyssinian-proper lands of Somalis, Harari, Southern Oromo, Sidama, Shanqella etc, the inhabitants were enslaved and heavily taxed by the gebbar-feudal system leading to depopulation.[48]
Some scholars consider the Amhara to have been Ethiopia’s ruling elite for centuries, represented by the Solomonic line of Emperors ending in Haile Selassie I. Marcos Lemma and other scholars dispute the accuracy of such a statement, arguing that other ethnic groups have always been active in the country’s politics. This confusion may largely stem from the mislabeling of all Amharic-speakers as “Amhara” even though they were from a different ethnic group, and the fact that many people from other ethnic groups have adopted Amharic names. Another is the claim that most Ethiopians can trace their ancestry to multiple ethnic groups, including the last self-proclaimed emperor Haile Selassie I and his Empress Itege Menen Asfaw of Ambassel of having both Amhara and Oromo linage.[49]
In southern Eritrea, the Aussa Sultanate (Afar Sultanate) succeeded the earlier Imamate of Aussa. The latter polity had come into existence in 1577, when Muhammed Jasa moved his capital from Harar to Aussa (Asaita) with the split of the Adal Sultanate into Aussa and the Sultanate of Harar. At some point after 1672, Aussa declined in conjunction with Imam Umar Din bin Adam’s recorded ascension to the throne.[50] In 1734, the Afar leader Kedafu, head of the Mudaito clan, seized power and established the Mudaito Dynasty.[51][52] This marked the start of a new and more sophisticated polity that would last into the colonial period.[52]
Oromo migrations, occurred with the movement of a large pastoral population from the southeastern provinces of the Empire. A contemporary account was recorded by the monk Abba Bahrey, from the Gamo region. Subsequently, the empire organization changed progressively, with faraway provinces taking more independence. A remote province such as Bale is last recorded paying tribute to the imperial throne during Yaqob reign (1590–1607).
By 1607, Oromos were also major players in the imperial politics, when Susenyos I, raised by a clan through gudifacha (or adoption), took power. He was helped by fellow Luba age-group generals Mecha, Yilma and Densa, who were rewarded by Rist feudal lands, in the present-day Gojjam districts of the same name.
The reign of Iyasu I the Great (1682–1706) was a major period of consolidation. It also saw the dispatching of embassies to Louis XIV’s France and to Dutch India. During the reign of Iyasu II (1730–1755), the Empire was strong enough to undertake a war on the Sennar Sultanate, where the emperor leading its army to Sennar itself, was afterwards forced to retreat upon defeat along the Setit river. Iyasu II also conferred the dignity of Kantibai of the Habab (northern Eritrea) after homage by a new dynasty.
In 1734, the Afar leader Kedafu, established the Mudaito Dynasty in Ethiopia, which later also came to include the southern Denkel lowlands of Eritrea, thus incorporating the southern denkel lowlands to the Sultanate of Aussa. 16th century also marked the arrival of the Ottomans, who began making inroads in the Red Sea area.[53][54][55][56][57]
The Wallo and Yejju clans of the Oromo people rise to power culminated in 1755, when Emperor Iyoas I ascended to the imperial throne in Gondar. They would be one of the major factions contending for imperial power during the ensuing Zemene Mesafint, starting from 1769, when Mikael Sehul, Ras of Tigray killed Iyoas I and replaced him with Yohannes II.
The establishment of modern Ethiopia was led by the Shawan people (which included both Amharas and Oromos), particularly Amhara emperors Tewodros II of Gondar, who governed from 1855 to 1868, Yohannis IV, who was from Tigray governed from 1869 to 1889 and managed to expand his authority into Eritrea, and Menelik II, who governed from 1889 to 1913 and repelled the Italian invasion of 1896.[24]
From 1874 to 1876, the Empire, under Yohannes IV, won the Ethiopian-Egyptian War, decisively beating the invading forces at the Battle of Gundet, in Hamasien province (in modern day Eritrea). In 1887 Menelik king of Shewa invaded the Emirate of Harar after his victory at the Battle of Chelenqo.
Beginning in the 1890s, under the reign of the Emperor Menelik II, the empire’s forces set off from the central province of Shoa to incorporate through conquest inhabited lands to the west, east and south of its realm. The territories that were annexed included those of the Western Oromo (non-Shawan Oromo), Sidama, Gurage, Wolayta, and Dizi. Among the imperial troops was Ras Gobena’s Shewan Oromo militia. Many of the lands that they annexed had never been under the empire’s rule, with the newly incorporated territories resulting in the modern borders of Ethiopia.
Ethiopia, unlike the rest of Africa, had never been colonized.[24] Ethiopia was accepted as the first independent African-governed state at the League of Nations in 1922.[24] Ethiopia was occupied by Italy after the Second Italo-Abyssinian War, but it was liberated by the Allies during World War II.[24]
Oromo Expansion, Heterogeneity, and Forced Assimilation of Other Ethnic Groups into the Oromo Identity
The Oromo people (Oromo: Oromoo; Ge’ez: ኦሮሞ, ’Oromo) [ http://anthromadness.blogspot.com/2015/03/the-oromo-people-heterogeneous.html]
The original Oromo speakers/ tribes were actually centered according to various sources speaking of the medieval to early modern Horn of Africa-> in Eastern Ethiopia where the Somali Region is now dominant, more specifically in the Southeasterly regions of Eastern Ethiopia, generally areas where the Jubba & Shebelle rivers drain.
However between the 15th to 17th Centuries CE , these agro-pastoralist tribes began to boldly expand inward into Ethiopia, conquering and assimilating in their wake with systems like their Gadaa acting as keen assets in these expansions, they even had their own pre-Islamic monotheistic belief system centered around the God Waaq, also shared by some pre-Islamic Somalis and perhaps even Afars among other groups.
They’ve been written about or mentioned by a plethora of writers of Ḥabesha, general Islamic-world, Portuguese and perhaps even Somali origins, many of whom encountered the fruits of their expansions one way or the other. In fact the Oromo tribes did once attempt incursions into Southern Somalia only to be pushed back by the dominant political entity of the time; the Ajuran Sultanate.
One can consult the following writers’ works on the expansions if they wish to:
Abba Paulos
Along with the Conquest of Abyssinia (Futuḥ Al-Ḥabash) by Shihab ed-Din speaking about the short-lived Islamic conquests of Abyssinia or even the chronicles of individuals such as Emperor Susenyos of Ethiopia.
The migrations were seemingly at first sporadic raids into the hinterlands that in time grew into what they were; migrations. At this time roughly in Ethiopia, the historically Muslim and mostly Somali soldiered but demographically multi-ethnic Adal Sultanate & the Abyssinian Empire (“Ethiopian Empire”) who were Ethiopia’s main political powers dominating different areas of what is now the modern state, had more or less bled each other into utter weakness after a terribly bloody war.
The eventual Oromo expansions are by some considered to have acted as a death blow to the Adal in particular, it and the Abyssinians along with other states in Ethiopia at the time proving too weak to prevent many of these Oromo expansions.
But this blog post is not so much about the expansions but rather the genetic impact they had on modern Oromos. You see, Oromos assimilated numerous “Horner” (Cushitic & even Ethiopian Semitic) peoples throughout their expansions. From Amharas to even Sidamic speakers, Rendilles, possibly even Agaws and in some instances Somalis.
A prime example of this I could share for now would be Sidamics (Highland East Cushitic speakers) such as Hadiya & Sidama people who once were the progenitors of prominent Islamic states in inland Ethiopia such as the Hadiya Sultanate. These groups were once known to have been spread across the modern Ethiopian provinces of Bale & Arsi and even North Shewa only to in some of these areas be supplanted and outright assimilated by expanding Oromo speakers.
“While Bale was the first Ethiopian province, Imam Ahmad Gragn conquered after the Battle of Shimbura Kure 1529, Emperor Geladewos quickly recovered it after the Imam‟s death. However, the territory eventually became the possession of the Oromo people that had begun settling there as early as the Mudana gadaa (1530–1538), and Bale disappeared as a distinct entity by the middle of the next century. The peoples of Hadiya-Sidama who was already Muslims predominantly occupied the ancient state of Bale. One of my informants (himself an Arsi Oromo) completely disagrees with this saying. Yet, Braukamper mentioned that the region of Gadab, which is located in the western Bale, belonged to Hadiyya and was occupied by various subgroups of this people, whose Oromized descendants (for instances, the clans Doodaa, Weegee, Caatimannaa, Adamoonyee, Wosharminaa, and many others) still live there.”[5, page 24]
The Hadiya Sultanate actually titled its rulers with the term “Garad” (Somali: Garaad, Arabic: الجاراد ) , an aristocratic title interchangeable with “Sultan” historically mostly known to have been used by Somalis (often along the Northern coast) as well as Muslim peoples in Medieval Ethiopia such as the Hadiya among other groups. And there indeed were seemingly diplomatic and cultural exchanges between the Hadiya entity and the Adal for example until the Hadiya became stalwart Abyssinian loyalists.
What this ultimately does to Oromos, this history of assimilation of other Horn African (namely several Ethiopian) ethnic groups and expansion into other areas, is that the modern Oromo ethnic group is in fact made up of various historically & genetically distinct groups even with its current constituents being utterly unaware of this (many are not aware to my knowledge). Now, the populations of the Horn of Africa are quite closely related but indeed there are some distinctions between them to be made.
That PCA plot (Principal Component Analysis)/ cluster based on autosomal DNA data above is a prime example of their heterogeneous nature. In terms of admixture levels within Pagani et al.’s original samples carried on by Hodgson et al. , Gudrasani et al. & Pickrell et al. among other papers; there are three subsets of Oromos.
One I like to dub “Oromo A” is Agaw-like in terms of fundamental admixture levels and clusters as you can see above at the fringe of the Northern Ethiopian Highland cluster with Xamir Agaws (“Afar” samples), Tigrinyas & Amharas whilst another group (Oromo B) clusters completely (overlapping) with Somalis demonstrating identical fundamental admixture levels with them to perhaps just a bit admixture for some who straddle between Somalis and Northern Ethiopian Highlanders. The Borana Oromos plots off with Wolaytas or even as one shows; proves almost less admixed than the majority of Wolaytas who can at times be comparable to Somalis in admixture levels.
Once again, one Oromo subgroup (Oromo B) is fundamentally identical to Somalis (based on more ancient and fundamental ancestral components), another comes close to Beta Israels (former Western Agaws) & the other would be Boranas, less admixed than Oromo Bs and Somalis.
The genetic data we have so far on Oromos clearly supports what the historical data tells us, that this ethnic group is an amalgamation of various distinct groups within the Horn of Africa it assimilated over the centuries after expansions. However… There are things all three of these Oromo genetic subgroups seem to share in common (something that sets them apart from other Horners).
They’re all, for one; the peak of Omotic admixture among the so far tested Cushitic & Ethiopian Semitic speaking populations in the Horn of Africa:
These newer components would for example be Omotic, Ethio-Somali (representing “shared Cushitic ancestry”) and so on.
A good way to grasp this would be-> fundamentally a Somali & a Tigrinya are barely different, there’s practically just a minor ~10–12% difference and that’s in levels of admixture not even in that one population has ancient ancestry the other lacks. However, in terms of actual more recently shared ancestry as this older post outlines; Somalis & Tigrinyas share about ~60–70% of their more recent to perhaps post-Neolithic ancestry.
Now, that’s still a lot of shared ancestry but, for example, some of the West Asian admixture in Tigrinyas while it is fundamentally the same as the admixture that was already in them (in “Cushitic”) and that is in Somalis; is ultimately ancestry they have that Somalis don’t.
Oromos, at least the ones who’ve been tested so far (not just in these studies) seem to be quite a peak for Omotic admixture in the Horn of Africa, something they all share in common over the rest of us despite their differing admixture levels.
Also engrossing would be that Y-DNA Haplogroup E-V32, a very prominent marker among ethnic Somalis (the most prominent actually) is very prominent among modern Oromos.
Somalis are also Lowland East Cushitic speakers, it is compelling to say the least that the two groups (“close linguistic relatives”) share in this marker’s prominence. Some such as a colleague I correspond with suggest sensibly that this maybe a mark of the “original Oromo tribes”, a very probable notion as linguistic & cultural shifts of this nature almost always leave some form of a genetic impact.
This would suggest most to many modern Oromos do ultimately trace some segment of their ancestry back to the peoples who linguistically shifted them away from whatever Cushitic or at times even Ethiopian Semitic language they originally spoke to Afaan Oromo.
Nevertheless, this ethnic group with its history of expansions and assimilation proves quite heterogeneous genetically, lacking the homogeneous and inbred nature of ethnic Somalis or even the homogeneity you’d find among Beta Israels & Tigrinyas. One colleague whom I often cite in my blog posts as being someone I frequently correspond with about genetics and history (same one I mentioned earlier) went so far as to consider them “More of a Cultural Group” rather than a traditional ethnicity such as Tigrinyas or Somalis.
I’m inclined to agree. But keep in mind that the peoples who were assimilated to form the modern ethnic group are essentially already closely related peoples (as all Horners seemingly are) so it’s not like some Azeris went and assimilated Bengalis & Moroccans but rather that Saudis would have assimilated Lebanese individuals and Yemenite Jews. Still a clear distinction to be made but relatively close peoples anyway; genetically, linguistically & culturally but in the end many Oromos have ancestors from just a few centuries ago who likely wouldn’t have spoken a single word of Afaan Oromo or any of its dialects and derivatives.
An Imperial Narrative Gets Recycled
Combatting False and Historical Revisionist Narratives on Ethiopian History, Culture, Politics, and Society though Foreign and Domestic Propaganda and Media.
[ https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2020/08/24/an-imperial-narrative-gets-recycled/ ]
A powerful and disturbing narrative is gaining traction among reporting on Ethiopia, its bias reflecting the connections of the current and past political and business elites with national and international media, NGOs, and foreign governments.
Most see Ethiopia through the eyes of what has long been Ethiopia’s dominant culture, the Amharic language, script, and calendar, and the Orthodox Church. Subconsciously, most outsiders absorb the sense of entitlement and superiority of those who practise and belong to this culture over the other — majority — peoples of Ethiopia who do not.
Institutional and institutionalized racism against Oromo and against the smaller nationalities in Ethiopia is enabled and empowered by zero-sum politics and its associated societal and domestic authoritarianism. Prejudice against people not represented in the dominant culture portrayed abroad as Ethiopia is rubbing off on journalists and power brokers.
Some commentators believe Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party plans to dismantle the limited regional autonomy guaranteed in the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution and claim that those who oppose this plan are violent ethno-nationalists who threaten Ethiopia’s democracy. That is the narrative gaining traction. It is as false as it is dangerous and it is a narrative that is driving a response.
In 1991, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) participated in the overthrow of the military regime, and participated for a year in the Transitional Government of Ethiopia organized by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), before it withdrew from the 1992 elections and its troops, encamped by agreement with U.S. and Eritrean mediators, were overrun.
In that year, the Minister of Education, Ibsa Gutama (one of four OLF Ministers), ensured primary education was to be carried out in Afaan Oromo in Oromia and in relevant languages in other regions. Indeed, under the federal system created after 1991 by the TPLF, for the first time Oromo people were governed, taught and were heard in court in their own language. To use the word ‘Oromia’, to use the better-suited Latin script for the Oromo language and to see it written down were each huge steps forward for the recognition of Oromo culture.
Those who promoted anything else Oromo, however, were persecuted.
After 2014, driven by the taking of land from Oromo farmers around Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) and by continuing political and economic marginalization, Oromo students, the Qeerroo/Qarree, launched a series of increasing protests. When these spread to other regions, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was propelled to power in April 2018, launching a series of reforms, including his declaration that political harassment is gone for good, releasing political prisoners, pardoning opposition parties and inviting exiled leaders to return and participate in a peaceful democratic process, declaring freedom of speech and press and ending a 20-year conflict with neighboring Eritrea, which earned him the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize.
In September 2018, the return of the OLF leadership to Finfinnee was celebrated by millions. There was talk of truth and reconciliation, mass education about human rights, and real representative democracy. Hope and confidence in progress, prosperity and equality was almost tangible.
It did not last.
Oromia Support Group reports have detailed how extrajudicial killings and large-scale detention have continued and accelerated. Since the assassination of singer Hachalu Hundessa on 29 June, many more have died in violent protests and many properties have been destroyed. Detentions, rape, burning of property and crops — an old-fashioned scorched earth policy — is under way in areas perceived to be supportive of the OLF. In February, many top officials of the OLF were arrested; leader, Dawud Ibsa, is now under house arrest.
There is now a media campaign against the OLF and anything Oromo and the Ethiopian government is working hard to persuade the outside world that Oromo journalists and supporters of the OLF and Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) are all terrorists. The similarities to 1992 and the subsequent crackdown on Oromo organisations that were also then labelled as terrorists are depressing.
The killing of Hachalu immediately reminded me of the killing of singer Ebbisa Addunya on 30 August 1996. Like Hachalu, he was inspirational to a generation of young Oromo. Today, just as in the 1990s, national and international media echo government claims of atrocities instigated by organised Oromo groups, amplified by biased social media. Internet and media closures are ensuring that the government version of events, aided by anti-Oromo national outlets, becomes received wisdom in the outside world; just as it did in 1992.
The man difference of the current repression with that of its predecessor is ominous.
The broad consensus among Oromo is that any degree of autonomy enjoyed under the 1995 Constitution is under threat. This would mean one step forward and two steps back: not the other way around. Not back to 1992, but back to 1974, the time of a highly unitary state; of one language, one culture, one religion, and Amhara identity, under the cover of Ethiopian nationalism. Oromo people are being forced against their will to belong to a country in which they feel disempowered and unrepresented. Again, their desire for at least a degree of autonomy is ignored and not taken seriously, as though they don’t matter. This is a recipe for disaster.
It is also necessary to understand that the authoritarian nature of northern Ethiopian society, regional zero-sum politics, and the assumption of rights over and above the conquered peoples of Ethiopia is based on racism. And only when this racism is acknowledged can Ethiopia progress toward a multicultural, rich, resource-abundant state with enough for all its peoples. But there must be equality; no domination of one culture over another. Dismantling the current federal structure of Ethiopia, whatever superficial guarantees of fairness and equality are given, will result in more marginalization of all cultures, except that of the Amhara, which is the lens through which almost all outsiders view Ethiopia.
Acceptance and agreement of the events and facts concerning the expansion of Abyssinia in the late 19th century is a much-needed foundation stone for a stable future Ethiopia. With an agreed history and a degree of regional autonomy, it is possible for all the peoples of Ethiopia to live their own culture with respect for the rights of others, with inclusivity in decision-making at an appropriate level, and respect for natural resources.
More violence and suppression, however, will eventually lead to the breaking up of Ethiopia, with most of the people in the southern two-thirds leaving the original Abyssinia as a rump state in the northwest. If the country of Ethiopia can only be maintained by state violence against its people, resentment will build until it fragments, like Yugoslavia. Far better to establish a mutually agreeable state structure.
The greater and more ingrained a prejudice is, the harder it is to be aware of it and tackle it. It is time for the Oromo and other peoples of Ethiopia to be treated equally and fairly. To deny people self-determination, to label those who wish to exercise this right as terrorists, and to force an unwilling population to belong to any geographic, political or cultural moiety is as dangerous as it is short-sighted. Equally, it could be so easily avoided if only the two sides of the self-determination debate, which has become ethnicized whether we like it or not, consider, understand and accommodate each other’s point of view. This can be settled in a civilized manner, without coercion or bloodshed.